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Abstract
The values of aggregative democracy have dominated much of civic education as its values reflect the
realities of the American political system. We argue that deliberative democratic theory better
addresses the moral and epistemological demands of democracy when compared to aggregative
democracy. It better attends to protecting citizens’ autonomy to participate in civic life and is able to
accommodate the diverse experiences and viewpoints of the American public. We conclude by examining how deliberative democracy provides a new lens on civic education practices. It calls for attention to be given to the process of the exchange of reasons among students and also allows students to
critically examine the current democratic process to determine in what ways it is or is not living up to
deliberative democratic ideals.

Q

uestions concerning education for
autonomy, education for democracy, and the
relationship between these two have been much
examined by philosophers. Less examined, however, is how
answers to these questions play out, or ought to, in classrooms and
schools under the rubric of civics education. For the most part,
civics education has implicitly been driven by a liberal conception
of citizenship: developing in students an understanding of the
rights (and duties, in some conceptions) of citizenship that are
necessary to ensure that the individual has a wide latitude to
determine what constitutes the good life and pursue that life. The
prevailing view has been that civics education should remain
neutral with respect to alternative conceptions of the good life, at
least those sufficiently “non-controversial” (Gutmann, 1999).
In this article, we explicate two prominent conceptions of
democracy and their associated conceptions of autonomy, both
encompassed by the broad liberal conception of citizenship just
described, and then illustrate how their differences underwrite
different approaches to civics education.1 In particular, we compare
an aggregative view of democracy with a deliberative democratic
view. We provide several reasons why deliberative democracy is the
better of the two conceptions and, accordingly, creates a better
foundation on which to build civics education. We then elaborate
the approach to civics education this conception supports.2
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The Superiority of Deliberative Democratic Theory
Contemporary democratic theory rests on two fundamental
premises, one moral and one epistemic. Morally, human beings
should be respected as autonomous agents, enabled to live life
“from the inside” (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 13; also see Gutmann, 1999,
particularly Chapter 1; Callen, 1997; Brighouse, 2000; Galston,
1995). Epistemically, social life is marked by uncertainty and vastly
varied experiences such that disagreement, including moral
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disagreement, between groups and individuals is one of its
permanent features. Thus, communal decisions that bind all
members of the community despite their differences are best
justified in terms of procedures that accommodate both of these
moral and epistemic features.
Democracy involves both a negative and a positive obligation
to respect autonomy. On the negative side, associated with political
liberty, people should be impeded as little as possible in achieving a
life made of their free choices. On the positive side, associated with
political equality, people should be provided with meaningful
opportunities to develop and exercise their autonomy. Proponents
of an aggregative view of democracy diverge from those with a
deliberative view on how to flesh out the general commitment to
autonomy in a democracy, particularly regarding how closely we
should identify autonomy with the capacity to participate effectively in democratic forums.
Deliberative democratic theory pays special attention to the
social context within which people live autonomous lives.
Although autonomy is a concept associated with the individual, it
is lived out in various communities, including the political
community. The idea of autonomy leads deliberative democrats to
focus on two important ideals. The first is mutual respect
(Gutmann, 1999). By asking people to engage in deliberations with
others, deliberative democracy requires participants to acknowledge the autonomy of others and the accompanying right to hold
moral positions on public issues that may differ from their own.
The second ideal associated with autonomy in deliberative
democracy is that democratic forums should promote inclusive
and fair participation. Therefore, deliberative democracy asks
participants to consider the question of the degree to which
democratic forums and democratic society accommodate inclusive and fair participation.
Deliberative democracy requires participants to respect one
another’s autonomy by engaging in good-faith critical dialogue
that includes a willingness to revise their initially preferred
policies and practices as a result of deliberation. The matters about
which people deliberate have cognitive epistemic status because
deliberative democracy asks citizens to provide evidence and
arguments to support their positions within a deliberation, and
that reasoning supports the goal of the entire process, which is to
reach conclusions that are the most warranted and should thus be
accepted as reasonable (though not necessarily correct) by all
concerned. In deliberative theory, the moral value of autonomy is
grounded in democracy in that it is the accepted autonomy of each
citizen that calls upon everyone to value and respect the moral
opinions of others by engaging in deliberation with them.
Democratic procedures are constrained in democracy’s own name
by being grounded in the requirement of fair and inclusive
conditions of participation.
The deliberative conception of democratic decision making
differs significantly from the conception associated with aggregative democracy (e.g., Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). Democratic
decision making consists of tallying citizens’ preferences to
produce collective decisions, typically by voting. (Chambers, 2003,
for instance, referred to the aggregative view as “voting-centric.”)
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Generally speaking, the aggregative conception gives little attention to the communicative process by which democratic decision
making should proceed. In its philosophical forms, the moral value
of autonomy identifies what it is for humans to live well and is
independent of its role in democracy. Democratic procedures are
constrained in the interest of protecting autonomy. Epistemically,
the cognitive status of the objects of democratic decision making
need not differ from deliberative theory, but the epistemic process
through which democratic decisions are reached does.
In its nonphilosophical forms, which better capture how
democratic decision making actually occurs in the United States,
the aggregative conception sees democratic decision making as
strategic rather than deliberative; it is a process whereby individuals
and groups attempt to win assent to their previously settled views
(preferences) using whatever rhetorical strategies prove effective,
including advertising, sound bites, issue framing, and so on. No
moral obligation to respect others’ autonomy exists beyond what
the formal rules and regulations of a modus vivendi require.
Epistemically, this form of aggregative democracy tends toward an
“emotive” conception of democratic decision making (House &
Howe, 1999). The idea of subjecting initial preferences to reasoned
evaluation and being open to revising them if justified is precluded
on epistemic grounds; for preferences are underpinned by values,
and values are not the kind of things for which people can provide
reasoned justification or criticism.
What we are calling the philosophical and nonphilosophical
forms of the aggregative conception of democracy differ in both
their moral and their epistemic premises (which are related).
Nonetheless, because each seriously neglects the moral evaluation
of communicative processes that underlie democratic decisions,
each is subject to two general criticisms that the deliberative
conception of democracy is designed to avoid. First, basing
decisions on the outcome of aggregated preferences while holding
these largely immune from criticism and revision serves to
entrench preexisting unjust distributions of goods such as income,
education, health care, and employment, as well as to stunt
effectiveness in the democratic process (Gutmann & Thompson,
2004). Second, such unjust distributions preclude the possibility of
“effective participation” in the democratic process on the part of
many citizens. Effective participation on the part of the citizenry is
a prerequisite of a robust democracy, which by definition enables
its citizens to live life autonomously through and as a consequence
of their participation in “conscious social reproduction”
(Gutmann, 1999).
In our view, the deliberative conception of democracy is
superior to the aggregative conception on the basis of the considerations just adduced. A thoroughgoing defense of this view would
require much more than the sketch we have provided, but that it is
beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we now consider how
certain aspects of civics education might change for the better when
considered through the lens of deliberative democratic theory.

Imagining Deliberative Civics Education
Taking deliberative democratic theory seriously when considering
civics education allows us to reframe certain practices already
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prevalent in civics education and provides new perspectives on
their importance. We first consider the way that deliberative
democracy’s approach to the moral premise of democracy affects
the civics classroom. We do this by examining the role of moral
controversies in civics education and the practices surrounding
holding and espousing one’s own moral viewpoints on political
issues. We then discuss how autonomy viewed through the lens of
deliberative democracy leads to mutual respect within a citizenry
(and classroom) and critical examination of the existing democratic system, the practices that accompany it, and the context in
which it functions.

Deliberative Civics Education
and Controversial Issues
Deliberative democracy addresses the epistemic issues of democracy by recognizing and bringing into the public sphere the moral
and social differences that exist within society. Because of this, it is
important to deliberative civics education that teachers make moral
controversies a key aspect. We agree with Gutmann (1999) and
others who argue that it is impossible to avoid moral content in
education and, even if it were possible, such an education would be
undesirable.
We acknowledge that incorporating moral controversy in the
civics classroom may not be an easy or comfortable task for
teachers, but it is important. Civics teachers should consider their
district’s policy about teaching controversial or sensitive issues in
the classroom. The variation of policies and the wording of such
policies illustrate varying levels of receptivity within schools
districts, and some of these may need revision to permit deliberative civics education. Consider the following excerpt from the
policy of our large local districts:
Administrators and teachers shall admit controversial issues to the
school program only when the problems are obviously real and
understandable to the students and when they are relevant to the
established curriculum for the grade and subject of the class. (Denver
Public Schools, 2011)

The wording of this policy, which allows admittance of controversial issues only in certain instances, is likely to give teachers pause
when they are considering discussing controversial issues in the
civics classroom. While the curriculum may be written in a way
that makes controversial issues relevant for use in the classroom,3
the policy is written in such a way that that option is prevented. For
purposes of comparison, consider this policy, from a school district
near the one mentioned above:
Controversy arising from such differences [in underlying values,
beliefs, and interests] is inherent in a pluralistic society. An important
function of public education is to provide students with an
understanding of how controversial issues are dealt with in a
democracy. This includes the opportunity to learn about the issues,
problems, and concerns of contemporary society, to form opinions, and
to participate in discussion of these issues and expression of opinion in
the classroom. (Jeffco Public Schools, 2011)
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This policy is more reflective of how deliberative democracy
views the epistemic premise of democracy. It acknowledges a
pluralistic society and the role of schools in addressing pluralism.
Although other aspects of this policy are similar to the previous
one, this wording invites teachers to bring controversial issues
into the classroom.
Of course, bringing controversial issues into the classroom is
not a new notion (see Hess, 2009). However, when looking at the
practice through the lens of deliberative democracy, we can see new
purposes in bringing controversial issues into the civics classroom.
For example, the Civic Mission of Schools Report (Carnegie
Corporation of New York & CIRCLE, 2003) advocates for the
discussion of controversial issues in the classroom because it is
likely to lead to “greater interest in politics, improved critical
thinking and communications skills, more civic knowledge, and
more interest in discussing public affairs out of school” (p. 6).
While all of these are laudable, terms like civic knowledge and
critical thinking and communication skills tend to be murky. Seeing
deliberation as part of education allows us to better understand
what should emerge from discussion of controversial issues in the
classroom. The following portions of the paper examine the
practice of deliberation to identify what civic knowledge and skills
might be developed by deliberative civics education.

The Deliberative Process in Civics Education
and the Development of Deliberative Skills
Before entering into deliberation in the classroom, students should
be prompted to come to a reasoned understanding of their own
moral convictions about controversial issues as part of understanding how deliberation addresses the epistemic premise of democracy. Students may enter the classroom with a variety of
experiences and degrees of familiarity with respect to the controversial issue. For some students, the issue will be familiar and they
will have engaged with it in various ways outside class, whether
through discussions within family or other social institutions.
Other students may not have given serious thought to the issue
because they felt no need to address it. Deliberative civics education
values the engagement of the first group and encourages those
students to continue the process of thinking through their own
perspective. For the second group, deliberative civics education
should prompt the students to consider the issue. Such students
likely have some position on the issue, even if it is not yet well
developed. Deliberative democracy asks students to identify the
reasons for that position, even if the sole reason at the start of the
deliberation is simply that it is what their parents have said about
the issue. Only by identifying their own reasons for a position on an
issue can students engage in deliberation. Morals and values may
lie at the heart of deliberation, and this process helps students come
to understand that these are at the same time reasoned positions
and can be discussed.
This may appear to limit deliberation in ways that disadvantage those who hold beliefs that are not supported by others as
legitimate. Hess (2009) illustrated this when she noted that some
teachers do not teach a controversial issue because they deny that
controversy exists. A teacher may clearly see a correct side to the
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controversy, and therefore may choose not to bring the issue into
the classroom for deliberation, as she would rather teach her
understanding of the “correct” position on the issue. In this
situation, and in light of deliberative democracy, both teachers and
students can develop an understanding of their own reasoning and
what it means to have reasons.
Talisse (2009), in a defense of his version of deliberative
democracy, described a universally shared folk epistemology that
undergirds deliberation. Reasonable people share certain characteristics with respect to the ideas of truth and knowledge, or at least
how we treat them in everyday living, without committing to any
particular and more precise epistemological framework. If we
believe that such a folk epistemology is accurate, we also have both
an understanding of what it means to hold a reasoned belief and a
rationale for attempting to understand the reasoning behind our
own moral convictions as well as the convictions of others.
As the first tenet of folk epistemology, Talisse said that all
people would agree that “to believe some proposition, p, is to hold
that p is true” (p. 87). In other words, we would all consider it odd
to say that we believe p, but we do not believe that p is true. His
point is that we assume a person who believes a proposition—and
in the case of deliberation, a moral proposition—also believes that
it is the case. This is not to deny that beliefs can vary in degree (in
that we believe certain things more strongly or surely than we do
others). This is not a difficult concept for students to grasp. They
understand that they do not intentionally hold beliefs that they see
as false.
The second tenet of folk epistemology provides that “to hold
that p is true is generally to hold that the best reasons support p” (p.
87). To put it another way, our folk epistemology says that our
beliefs are reason-responsive. Because this is folk epistemology, it
does not dictate what the best reasons for a belief should be. It
simply states that we would consider it odd for someone to say, “I
believe p even though I have better reasons for thinking x is truer
than p.”
This is an important idea for students to grasp as part of
deliberative civics education. Even if the reason underlying a
student’s moral belief is that his parents said so or that she read a
celebrity’s opinion on the issue, that student should recognize that
these are reasons for belief (however nascent or refutable these
reasons may be). Similarly, students can recognize from folk epistemology that some reasons supersede others and that they themselves adjust their beliefs when confronted with more persuasive
reasons. Even young students recognize that they have reasons to
believe certain people more than others and that some reasons are
more persuasive than others. All of this does not dictate, however,
the framework that a student uses to determine what makes one
reason more persuasive than another.
This is the beginning of the students’ development of a
framework for understanding the reasons for their own beliefs and
what is morally persuasive within their moral framework. As
students develop an understanding of the reasons underlying their
own beliefs regarding controversial issues, they also learn how to
share those beliefs with others. Through their examination of their
own beliefs, they come to understand that people can hold a variety
democracy & education, vol 19, n-o 2

of moral beliefs and that they are all underpinned by some set of
reasons. This provides a foundation for developing deliberative
dispositions.
One key deliberative disposition is listening to others. If
students gain an understanding of folk epistemology, they will have
motivation to listen to others’ reasons for beliefs. This is because
students who understand folk epistemology understand that their
own beliefs are subject to change when challenged by good enough
reasons. If they desire to believe those things that have the best
reasons, if they understand why they believe what they do on a
particular issue, and if they acknowledge that new reasons can
change their beliefs, they should have a willingness to listen to the
reasons others have for their beliefs.
In the same way, students will develop the disposition to share
their beliefs and the reasons underpinning those beliefs with
others. They see themselves as holding reasoned beliefs and
believing that they have the potential to influence others, who also
hold reason-responsive beliefs. This is important because it
provides clarity of the guidelines that civics teachers follow for
these types of activities in their classrooms.
Consider for example the Colorado Academic Standards for
Social Studies (Colorado Department of Education, 2009). Listed
among the competencies for high school students is the following:
Decision making involves researching an issue, listening to multiple
perspectives, and weighing potential consequences of alternative
actions. For example, citizens study the issues before voting. (p. 97)

What does it mean to listen to multiple perspectives? If listening
means more than being exposed to an aural stimulus, in what ways
should the students engage with these multiple perspectives? What
role should students’ own perspectives play in this process? Should
students be the source of (at least some of) the multiple perspectives?
A deliberative democratic lens provides insight into these
questions. Listening to multiple perspectives is not done for mere
exposure, but because students understand that others have
reasoned beliefs that may influence their own reason-responsive
beliefs. Students understand their own framework for weighing the
reasons provided by others, and this provides a way for students to
engage with what they hear from these other perspectives. They
understand their own perspectives in a way that allows them to
determine whether what they are hearing requires them to adjust
their own beliefs. Also, because teachers recognize that students
hold reasoned positions (though with varying quality of reason),
teachers can see students as the source of at least some of the
perspectives that should be present in the classroom.
This process of identifying one’s own reasons for holding a
position on an issue together with sharing that position with and
listening to others can contribute to the development and expansion of public reason. Deliberation becomes a common framework
for reasoning. Rawls (1997) and Gutmann and Thompson (1996)
each conceive of public reason as providing boundaries around
what ideas can be brought to a deliberation. Citizens present their
rationales for positions on moral issues in terms that are acceptable
to all. Conversely, arguments based on reasons that are not
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accessible to all citizens, such as those stemming from religious
convictions, are excluded. Using public reason to draw boundaries
around deliberation in schools has been criticized, rightly, in our
view, for placing too great a restriction on deliberation and for
favoring the reasons of the majority (Kunzman, 2006). By having
students share their reasons with others during the education stage,
and by using the framework above to understand the process, we
see a path to expanded public reason. Students would be encouraged to share their own reasons for holding a belief without the
restriction that it be considered generally acceptable by all. As
students engage in this process, their frameworks for evaluating
reasons are shaped by one another, with the potential that the
concept of public reason itself would not remain static and outside
of the deliberative process but instead also be shaped by the sharing
of reasons.
We recognize that asking students to share their reasons for
holding certain beliefs entails more risk for some students than for
others. Like all deliberative spaces, classrooms are likely to be safer
for some students than others. Young (1996) illustrated this in her
critique of deliberative democracy when she notes that certain
forms of discourse, such as storytelling and greeting, may not be
considered acceptable in certain environments. Students who are
not familiar with the more accepted forms of discourse may not feel
safe or competent to share their views. However, if safe public
spaces for deliberation are ever likely to come into existence, this
change will begin with the civics classroom. It is there that people
have the opportunity to create and experience a safety that allows
everyone to share beliefs.4 Equally important, it is a place where
students can be challenged to consider others’ reasons and thereby
expand their own reasoning. If teachers succeed in creating safe
spaces, they also provide spaces for potentially impactful views that
would otherwise go unexpressed. Reluctance to share beliefs may
be justified, and this should be recognized, but this underscores the
importance of the context within which deliberation occurs and its
fairness and inclusivity.
Similarly, asking students to share their reasons and in turn
consider other people’s reasons may be seen as threatening to
certain ways of life. Parents might resist their children being
exposed to (and asked to consider seriously) the beliefs of others
and the reasons behind those beliefs. This is perhaps nowhere more
clearly illustrated than in the case of Mozert v. Hawkins County
Board of Education (1987). In this case, parents asked to have their
children exempted from the school’s reading curriculum, which
was selected to meet the mandates of Tennessee to teach the values
and virtues of citizenship, because the curriculum exposed
students to ideas that were contrary to the parents’ religious beliefs.
We can easily imagine that if parents are threatened by their
children being exposed to other ideas in readings, they would
strenuously object to having their students engage in deliberation
about the values and ideas in the readings. We also easily find those
parents’ objections misguided.
If the parents’ objections are based on the idea that values
should be shaped by institutions other than school, such as the
family and religion, the objection does not hold. Schools and the
civics education that occurs within them cannot be value neutral.
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Although a civics education based on aggregative democracy may
claim to be value neutral, a network of values undergirds it. As
discussed earlier, interpretations of autonomy, which are value
laden, lie at the core of the purportedly value-neutral curriculum.
For example, aggregative democracy interprets the value of
equality as the equal opportunity to participate in the aggregative
democratic process through voting, regardless of how meaningful
the choices are. Deliberative democracy would argue that such an
interpretation of equality is meaningless without considering the
context and process that led to the choices presented to the voter.
If the parents believe that the only values that should be
present in schools are those that are noncontroversial or that are
universally shared, they again are in an untenable position. It is
difficult to identify a set of universal values or virtues that have any
depth. We grant that there is a high probability that everyone would
agree on the importance of values like freedom and equality or
virtues such as patience—so long as their meanings remain vague.
As soon as people interpret these concepts or apply them, they
become controversial. Freedom has limits, but where should the
limits be drawn? Are there situations where people should willingly
restrict their own freedom for the benefit of others? Does equality
require treating all people equally such that we should not prohibit
a five-year-old from driving? If a five-year-old should not drive,
what are valid grounds for treating people differently? At what
point does patience become a vice because it has turned into
neglect or inaction? These questions illustrate how even values that
are shared are likely shared only in a thin sense and not in a way
that is meaningful to civics education.
The inability to purge education, and particularly civics
education, of moral content makes it reasonable to expect students
to share their opinions and to listen to others’ opinions. The
alternative is to do away with common education and instead have
parents educate or choose an education that aligns with their moral
beliefs. However, even the most insular groups have some amount
of diversity in beliefs. We grant that this minimal diversity may be
less objectionable to parents, but keeping moral controversy out of
civics education thrusts us back to aggregative democracy, in which
moral views are not seen as subject to reason.
In the philosophical form of aggregative democracy, the
position one holds on a particular controversial issue and why such
a position is held is not the concern of the democratic process. It
could be acknowledged that controversial issues exist, but asking
students to examine and revise their own perspectives as part of
civics education would not be of key importance. Because the
ability to determine and pursue one’s own conception of the good
life is an individual right that exists independently from the
functioning of democracy, civics education need not bring these
controversial issues into the classroom except insofar as knowledge
of alternative conceptions of the good life might contribute to
students’ autonomy.
In the nonphilosophical form of aggregative democracy,
which views democracy as largely a strategic enterprise, less
attention is paid to the questions of why one holds certain positions
and more to how to ensure that a person’s interests are protected
within the civic arena. The emphasis is on such things as debating,
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coalition building, and strategic maneuvering, not on opening
one’s beliefs (preferences) up for critical scrutiny. Consider again
the excerpt from the Colorado Academic Standards for Social
Studies (Colorado Department of Education, 2009):
Decision making involves researching an issue, listening to multiple
perspectives, and weighing potential consequences of alternative
actions. For example, citizens study the issues before voting.

Interpreting this from the perspective of aggregative democracy
yields a different outcome than does examination from the
perspective of deliberative democracy. The research a student
performs and the rationale for listening to multiple perspectives
shift to a more self-interested perspective. Students may research
issues solely for the purpose of buttressing their own arguments,
not considering that other perspectives may be legitimately held.
Students might listen to multiple perspectives in order to form the
strategy to best discredit those other perspectives. While this is
somewhat of a caricature of the aggregative position, it does
meaningfully reflect what can happen when the democratic
process is viewed not as a forum where people’s perspectives are
shaped through interactions with one another but rather as a place
where one’s only role is that of advocate for one’s own perceived
best interests.
Similarly, the aggregative view of democracy does not
concern itself with the development of public reason. People have
the right to believe what they will and little concern need be paid in
the democratic process to developing commonalities or to having
one’s critical thinking process challenged. Citizens’ perspectives
can remain private, and people need not concern themselves with
the rationales behind positions except, again, as a strategic matter.5

Developing Deliberative Character
The epistemic premise of democracy points to the development of
deliberative skills. In this section, we look to the moral premise of
democracy and consider how the connection between deliberative
democracy, civics education, and autonomy in the classroom leads
to understanding deliberative character. Amy Gutmann is a
leading deliberative theorist who has probably done more to
ground education in democracy than any philosopher but Dewey
(in whose tradition she locates her project). Gutmann (1999)
identified two general features that are constitutive of democratic
character—the kind of character suited to deliberative
democracy—both of which are necessary and neither of which is
sufficient alone: character and moral reasoning. Character refers to
dispositions and habits acquired through inculcation, and moral
reasoning refers to logical and interpretive skills. Gutmann wrote:
Deliberative citizens are committed, at least partly through the
inculcation of habit, of living up to the routine demands of democratic
life, at the same time they are committed to questioning those demands
whenever they appear to threaten the foundational ideals of
democratic sovereignty, such as respect for persons. The willingness and
ability to deliberate set morally serious people apart from sophists, who
use clever argument to elevate their own interests into self-righteous
democracy & education, vol 19, n-o 2

causes, and traditionalists, who invoke established authority to
subordinate their own reason to unjust causes. (1999, p. 52)

Gutmann is quite explicit that her conception of democratic
character is not morally neutral toward autonomy.6 Here she differs
from other philosophers critical of deliberative democracy’s
implications for civics education, who hold that teaching children
to be autonomous has no place in public schools (e.g., Galston,
1989) or that it does but should be facilitated (children should be
taught the requisite skills to exercise if they choose) rather than
promoted (children should not be expected or required to embrace
autonomy or think autonomously) (e.g., Brighouse, 2000). We are
in fundamental disagreement with the view that teaching children
to be autonomous has no place in the public schools, and we find
the idea of facilitating but not promoting autonomy incoherent.
Autonomy is associated with habits of mind that must be developed and practiced over time. It would require very stilted
conversations, indeed, if teachers went through the motions of
asking for and giving reasons but remained noncommittal as to the
value of such an undertaking.
There are two core ideas that anchor the connection between
civics education and autonomy. Deliberative democracy does not
keep the idea of autonomy external to the democratic process but
rather makes it internal by requiring that the autonomy of others be
given important consideration. As a result, civics education needs to
demand of its students mutual respect as part of deliberative
character. Civics education must also attend to the conditions under
which all can exercise autonomy. Therefore, students are called upon
to examine the degree to which all have the opportunity to participate in the democratic process. This involves not only examining the
conditions surrounding deliberation but also examining the
democratic process as it exists from within and identifying ways in
which it permits or constrains people’s autonomy.
If the civics education classroom is to teach mutual respect,
we must first identify what that includes. On this, we find it helpful
to consider Gutmann and Thompson’s (1996) concept of reciprocity. A key component of reciprocity is that people recognize the
moral status of others in a deliberation (and in politics). This
means that students must learn to view others in deliberation as
engaging in a legitimate exchange of moral viewpoints rather than
as expressing a “purely strategic, economic or political view”
(p. 86). Similarly, students must learn themselves that such
behavior is not acceptable as part of the deliberative process.
At first glance, this appears naive. The real world of politics fits
much better with the aggregative conception than with the
deliberative conception of democracy. In civics education,
shouldn’t students learn how to function in the political world as it
really works? The answer to this is yes and no. Civics education
provides a unique opportunity not only to learn about the political
process but also to examine it through the lens of mutual respect
and autonomy. Deliberative democracy is, after all, a normative
political theory, developed in large part as an alternative to
aggregative democracy, and one that is much more faithful to the
ideal of democracy.
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As students go through the process of identifying their own
beliefs and exchanging positions with others, they will also have the
opportunity to learn that the way such exchanges are structured can
impact the end results of deliberative process. Sunstein (2000) has
shown that a deliberative group of people with compatible mindsets
is likely to become more extreme in its positions as a result of
deliberation. He illustrates how the composition of deliberative
groups can impact the impact of deliberations on participants.
Power can clearly impact the deliberative process (Shapiro, 1999).
The deliberative process is not immune from strategic behavior
(Simon, 1999). These are legitimate criticisms of deliberation, but
they are also criticisms that can be addressed, at least in part, by
thinking about civics education through a deliberative lens.
By engaging in a deliberation in the civics classroom, students
can learn to evaluate various democratic processes, including
deliberation itself, to determine whether the process respects their
own autonomy and the autonomy of others. By starting education
about deliberation with the formulation of one’s own opinion and
sharing these opinions with others, deliberative education establishes a norm for political discussion (if not the entire political
process) that respects each person’s autonomy by providing space
for each person to share his own perspectives. As deliberation
progresses to analysis and criticism of the various perspectives in
the class, students can reflect on the degree to which the deliberation respected their own autonomy as well as the autonomy of
others who shared their perspectives with the class.
Again, this may seem highly improbable, but the deliberative
process in the civics classroom can be structured so that such
thinking is encouraged. Students can be prepared to evaluate and
criticize other perspectives through a process that encourages
mutual respect. After engaging in deliberation, students can be
asked to consider what it was about the other viewpoints that made
them persuasive or unpersuasive. They can compare the reasons
given by others for their positions to their own and determine the
degree to which their viewpoint should change in response to these
other reasons. Additionally, students should consider what other
information they need from the students to properly evaluate the
reasons given. This type of preparation can provide groundwork for
deliberation that encourages the mutual respect that is required for
deliberation.
Students can also learn to become self-evaluators of the
deliberative process that they engage in. They can learn that it is
appropriate to ask whether everyone had the opportunity to
participate. They can learn to ask whether there were viewpoints
that were not included in the deliberation that should be considered. They can continue to evaluate their own framework for
critical thinking by asking why they found certain things more
persuasive than others and why that was the case.
Again, teachers of civics cannot ignore the realities of our
political system as it exists. Deliberative democracy allows students
to see how the current democratic arrangement operates and then
evaluate how well the system respects people’s autonomy and their
ability to participate within the system. Through the lens of
autonomy and deliberative democracy, students can examine both
the process and the context of our current democratic system.
democracy & education, vol 19, n-o 2

Consider the typical civics education lesson of how a bill
becomes a law. Students learn about how a bill is introduced and the
path through the legislative bodies to the executive’s desk. As they
do so, the deliberative concern with autonomy would encourage
them to ask why particular bills are introduced at all. In other words,
whose perspectives are included in the bill that is introduced? They
can examine legislative hearings and determine to what people or
groups of people the legislators are listening in this process. They
can consider whether hearings reflect an important part of the
process or whether legislators’ views are chiefly shaped by other
means. They can wonder if legislative hearings and floor debates
reflect the deliberative process or if they reflect strategic behavior on
the part of participants. These are not new questions in civics
education, but students’ deliberative experiences allow them to
question the degree to which these processes reflect mutual respect.
In addition to examining the democratic process, students can
also examine the social context within which this democratic
process occurs in order to understand why they do or do not
respect autonomy. Gutmann and Thompson (1996) argued that
there are certain minimum social conditions that are required for a
person’s participation in deliberative democracy. These include
minimum standards for basic needs such as housing and health
care. Society is responsible for ensuring that these minimum
standards are met in order for the democratic process to maintain
its legitimacy. These minimum standards are not immutable but are
themselves subject to the deliberative process. Therefore, students
would engage questions such as those posed by Brady, Verba, and
Schlozman (1995) concerning the ways that resource distribution
affects various types of political activities.
As an example, consider the issue of how campaigns work in
the current democratic system. As part of this process, students
might examine the issue of campaign finance regulations and the
case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), the
Supreme Court case that declared restrictions on independent
campaign expenditures by corporations and unions unconstitutional. Under a discussion or debate that occurs without the
deliberative democratic lens, students could formulate a variety of
opinions concerning the outcome of the case. Some might agree
with the outcome, because they value freedom and argue that
restricting corporations from spending money is a restriction of
freedom. Along those lines, they would argue that this value should
trump other concerns about access to the political process, perhaps
suggesting that there are a variety of ways for individuals and
organizations to influence the political process and that singling
out independent expenditures of money unfairly burdens those
who happen to have that resource. Others may argue that the case
was decided wrongly, those students view money as a particularly
influential resource and value equality of participation above
freedom to spend money to express political views.
The deliberative democratic lens would change the nature of
the deliberation by asking students to explicitly consider two
factors for each reason argued. The first would ask the students to
think about the idea of mutual respect and seeing one another as
reasonable. With respect to participating in politics, students
would have to consider what processes entities such as
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corporations and unions go through in forming their political
opinions. While these can vary, students can compare the possible
processes to their own process of opinion formation and evaluation. Does folk epistemology hold true for these entities in such a
way that the political opinions expressed by them should be
afforded the same assumption of reasonableness and mutual
respect that we give fellow citizens? As students consider questions
such as this, they would engage in a reasoning process, driven by
deliberative ideals, that allows them to form their own answer.
The second factor would ask the students to consider this
question through the lens of access and opportunity. Students
would ask in what ways the results of this decision might skew
what voices are heard in the democratic process. If certain voices
might be pushed to the margins, what is the appropriate response?
Does it require that a different decision be reached? Are there other
ways to address the issue that would respect the value of freedom
and protect autonomy? If people determine that messages from
these entities should be discounted in certain instances, is that
enough to dilute such a group’s voice and provide disincentive for
money to be spent in independent political expenditures? These
questions would not necessarily arise in discussions absent a
framework of deliberative democracy.
Aggregative democracy does not have the same concerns
about autonomy and would not require the same type of civic
education outlined above. Aggregative democracy need only
concern itself with the strategic activity of others. Gutmann and
Thompson (1996) illustrated two approaches that civics education
influenced by aggregative democracy could take. On the one hand,
students might learn how to best advocate for their own positions
through the use of strategy. This would reflect the idea of
prudence—that many political disagreements are best resolved
through bargaining and, like aggregative democracy itself,
students should be concerned most with the procedures surrounding the bargaining process. We agree with Gutmann and
Thompson that bargaining cannot substitute for moral reasoning,
because it does not reflect what citizens owe one another as
autonomous yet interdependent members of society.
Alternatively, students could be taught impartiality as an
alternative to deliberation and that would be part of an education
in the aggregative democracy tradition. Students would find moral
claims to support their positions that are acceptable from an
impersonal perspective (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). But this
also fails to show mutual respect for fellow citizens because it
denies the epistemic premise of democracy—that there is a
diversity of reasonable beliefs. Students in this tradition would be
taught to demonstrate the moral truth of their claims, thereby
denying that people may have different frameworks for evaluating
the content of moral claims. This perspective stifles public discourse because, after having demonstrated the moral truth of a
claim, citizens will label those who disagree with this demonstration of the truth as unreasonable.

Conclusion
As conversations about civics education continue, the theory of
democracy that underlies civics education deserves attention. We
democracy & education, vol 19, n-o 2

have shown how deliberative democracy attends better to the
moral and epistemic premises of democracy and how viewing
civics education through the lens of deliberative democracy
provides new insights into civics education. The classroom
practices, content standards, and school board policies discussed
in this paper are the beginnings of what we believe to be an
important discussion in civics education.
If deliberative democracy is to impact civics education in a
meaningful way, there are many issues yet to be explored. More
consideration must be given to how to balance teaching for the
aspirational goals of a more deliberative democracy and the
realities of our current democratic system. Scholars such as Walter
Parker (2006) have done much to advance thinking about discussion in the civics classroom, but we believe that it would be fruitful
to consider how an explicitly deliberative democratic theoretical
perspective can add to the purposes and pedagogy related to
discussion in the classroom. There are also questions related to
how to prepare teachers to engage students in deliberation,
particularly when they themselves may not have engaged in
deliberation in their own school learning experiences. We invite
others to consider whether deliberative democracy should be
considered as a guide for civics instruction and, if it should, to
explore these and other implications for civics education.
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Notes
1. The general liberal framework has been challenged, of course,
from various directions: postmodernist, critical, and communitarian. Although we believe the conception of civics education we
advance here can accommodate or fend off these challenges, that is
an argument for another place.
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2. In this paper, we focus on civics education, meaning courses
such as government and civics classes that are explicitly designed to
prepare students to participate in political life. The illustrations in
the paper are those that would be found in a civics class. This is
done solely for clarity and to focus the scope of the paper. We
believe deliberative democratic theory should be considered with
respect to civics education in general, and should permeate how the
entire educational experience prepares students for political life.
The principles of deliberative democracy can be modeled through
classroom norms and school governance. It should also be a
consideration in general education classes as deliberation can
occur across subject areas.
3. The curriculum is guided by the Colorado Academic Standards
for Social Studies. Although those standards make no explicit
mention of controversial issues, students are expected to “research,
formulate positions, and engage in appropriate civic participation
to address local, state, and national issues or policies.” (Colorado
Department of Education, 2009, p. 17)
4. Training teachers to create deliberative spaces in the classroom is
a formidable challenge and a discussion of the challenge is beyond
the scope of this paper. See Stitzlein (2010) for a discussion of
current work in this area.
5. For example, in aggregative democracy, a person need not
genuinely believe in or understand an evidentiary basis for
supply-side economics in order to assert that basis in the political
arena to win assent to the policy of tax cuts for the wealthy.
6. Gutmann defines moral autonomy in a more specific and limited
way than we might autonomy, and she rejects it as a necessary
ingredient of democratic citizenship. In particular, Gutmann
defines moral autonomy as “the desire and capacity to make moral
choices based on principles generalizable among all persons”
(1999, p. 59).
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